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Inventory Reduction and Productivity Growth:
Linkages in the Japanese Automotive Industry
Abstract
The literature on JIT production suggests a causal link between work-in-process
inventory and manufacturing productivity. Such a connection has been described in
numerous case studies but never tested statistically. This paper uses historical data for 52
Japanese automotive companies to evaluate the inventory-productivity relationship. We
find that firms increased their productivity rank during periods of substantial inventory
reduction. More detailed tests suggest that inventory reductions stimulated gains in
productivity: on average, each 10°/0 reduction in inventory led to about a 10/0gain in
labor productivity, with a lag of about one year. Such effects were more immediate for
Toyota affiliates but undetectable for close suppliers of Nissan. These findings imply
that inventory reduction served as an important driver of process improvement for many
Japanese automotive companies, although some firms emphasized other methods.
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I. Introduction
In the past decade manufacturing managers and academic researchers have
dramatically changed their view of work-in-process (WIP) inventories. These
inventories, held as a buffer between processing steps in manufacturing plants, were once
considered essential for maintaining a steady production flow. But the wide acceptance
of “just-in-time” (JIT) production has led to the contrary view that these inventories
prevent the discovery of problems on the shop floor and can thus be detrimental to
productivity. According to this new perspective, inventory reductions expose defects in
the manufacturing process, forcing managers and workers to eliminate (rather than
accommodate) sources of process variability.
Various authors have described the causal mechanisms linking inventory
reduction to productivity growth (e.g., Schonberger, 1982; Hall, 1983). Nevertheless,
many questions remain unanswered. Does inventory reduction lead to productivity gains,
or does it merely serve as an indicator that process variability has been reduced, so that
less buffer stock is required? And if inventory reductions do stimulate productivity gains,
how quickly do the gains appear, and what is the magnitude of effect?
Details of JIT implementation have been addressed in numerous case studies.’
Nevertheless, there have been few statistical analyses of the connection between work-in-
process inventory and manufacturing productivity.2 In this paper we investigate this
connection using data for 52 Japanese automotive assemblers and parts suppliers over the
period from 1965 to 1991.
1 see, for ~xmple, Mcmden (1981, 1983) ad tie studies cited in surveys by Irn and Lee (1989) and VOSSand
Robinson (1987).
We employ three different statistical approaches to evaluate the nature and
magnitude of linkage between W_IP inventory and productivity. First, we apply an
algorithm to the inventory data to identi~ periods of substantial WIP reduction. During
these periods, firms are found to have (1) increased their productivity rank, and (2)
exhibited significantly higher rates of productivity growth. Second, we use regression
analysis to examine the correlation between inventory levels and labor productivity.
Third, we perform more elaborate tests of the time structure of inventory-productivity
relationships. These tests show that WIP reductions were followed on average by
significant productivity gains, with a typical lag of about one year. Significant
differences are observed, however, between “keiretsu” company groups. In general, the
findings point to a statistically significant link between WIP reduction and productivity
growth for most companies in our sample.
II. Theoretical Framework
The connections between work in process inventory and plant productivity can be
represented in a causal link diagram, as shown in Figure 1. This diagram illustrates the
links between (a) the productivity of a factory, (b) its “actual” and “required” work in
process inventory, and (c) the detection, analysis and resolution of specific types of
production problems.
The diagram shows five important links, which can be briefly characterized as
follows. If the gap between actual and required WIP inventoty is made small, the types
of production problems that create the need for buffer inventories become visible (link 1).
Once visible, these problems can be solved, which will have a positive effect on
productivity (link 2). The removal of these problems also feeds back to reduce the need
for WIP inventory (link 3); and actual WIP can be adjusted accordingly (link 4). Finally
2 Liebemm ( 1990) documents ~ ~e~ative correlation ~~een Wrp inventory and labor productivity for Japanese
automotive assemblers in the mid-1970s. A comparative assessment of inventory and productivity trends in the
Japanese and US automotive industries is provided in Lieberman and Asaba ( 1997).
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the diagram shows that the reduction of actual WIP lowers the costs of inventory holding
and related activities, making an additional contribution to productivity (link 5).
It is useful to explore the mechanisms behind these links a bit deeper. We start
with the distinction between actual and required WIP inventory. In any production line,
WIP is used to protect the production flow from the variability and discontinuities of
production. In general, as variability rises and as discontinuities become more
pronounced, more WIP will be necessary to achieve a certain level of output. Also, as the
desired level of output approaches the effective capacity, more WIP will be necessary.
The minimum amount of WIP needed to guarantee the desired level of output for a
production line is what is called “required WIP inventory” in the diagram. Depending on
how the line is managed, actual WIP inventory will fall behind, equal or exceed the
required level.
When the gap between actual and required WIP inventory is made small (or
negative), problems will arise, constraining or disrupting the production flow (link 1).
Workers or machines will become idle, either because they lack parts as a result of an
upstream problem or, in a pull system, because they lack production authorization (e.g.
kanban cards) as a result of a downstream problem. The types of “problems” that may
surface include machine failures, defective production, time-consuming machine setups,
long transportation distances, unbalanced lines, and lack of coordination. Because
workers and supervisors are often rewarded on the basis of the output of a particular
machine or production stage, they will automatically direct their attention to the cause of
idleness. It is this mechanism that is often referred to by the “rocks in the water”
metaphor for JIT: the “rocks” on the bottom of the riverbed (the production problems) are
exposed by lowering the “water” in the river (the amount of WIP inventory).
The diagram also shows a link that indicates that once the rocks are exposed, they
will be removed from the river; in other words, detected problems will be solved. How,
if, and when this will happen depends on the problem solving capabilities present in the
factory. Sakakibar& et. al (1997) capture these problem solving capabilities by what they
5
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call JIT inhstructure. They find that more than inventory reduction itself, it is the
presence of JIT inhstructure that leads to improvements in”performance. Essentially,
once a problem surfaces, workers or teams of workers need to organize themselves to
determine the root cause of the problem and design, test and implement a solution. Some
solutions are quick, but others may take months or years to implement, as in the case of
quality control mechanisms, machine maintenance procedures, or setup time reduction.
Link 2 in the diagram indicates that as a result of solving the problems that cause
the need for WIP inventory, productivity will increase. The problems that cause the need
for WIP inventory typically involve some type of production waste. When this waste is
removed, whether it is waste of materials, waste of worker time or waste of machine time,
productivity rises. In addition, if this problem solving causes the quality of the final
product to be improved, the company may command a higher price for its product and
reduce its costs for warranty programs, causing productivity to improve further.3
Problem solving may also lead to a reduction of the ‘required’ WIP inventory as
indicated by link 3 in the diagram. For example, increased machine reliability will
decrease the need for
sizes economical.
Link 4 reflects
buffer inventories, and reduced setup times will make smaller lot
management’s recognition that inventory requirements have fallen,
so actual inventory can be reduced. In a production line that is controlled by kanbart
cards for example, cards must be removed from the system to achieve such a reduction.
In MRP-type systems, inventories remain unchanged until the lead time estimates and lot-
sizes that are used as parameters in these systems are reset to lower values. The lag
between the reduction in ‘required’ WIP and the reduction in actual WIP will depend on
how tightly this link is managed.
3 A key ~~umPtion is that tie ~os~ of problem solvingarcSmallcomparedto the benefits; i.e., problems that create a
need for WIP inventory are usually not hard to solve but often fail to get attention. Most examples from the
descriptive literature (e.g., Shonberger (1982), Monden ( 1983)) seem to satisfy this requirement
6
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Finally, link 5 of the diagram indicates that the reduction of actual WIP inventory
can lead directly to increased productivity. This can happen in several ways. The costs of
inventory carrying and material management may fall. Also, as manufacturing lead times
shorten, faster feedback will reduce the amount of scrap and rework as well as the need
for safety stock in the finished goods inventory. Externally, these inventory reductions
may allow quicker response to the market. In markets where this is important, product
prices might be positively affected and so might productivity, measured appropriately.
The causal link diagram in figure 1 provides a framework for understanding the
statistical models and for interpreting the results presented later in this paper. It also
allows us to state the theoretical questions more clearly. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to estimate the model implied by Figure 1 directly, as we lack data on the problem
solving processes that occur within firms. Rather, it is necessary to infer the linkages
from time series observations of (actual) inventory and labor productivity across the
sample of automotive companies.
Our primary tests are designed to detect evidence of links 1 and 2. Does
inventory reduction play a role in stimulating (unobserved) problem solving and
subsequent productivity growth? Or does inventory reduction simply arise in response to
successful problem solving and improvements in productivity (links 3 and 4)? What is
the typical magnitude of these effects, and how long are the lags?
The strength of these links and the speed of response may vary greatly across
pkmts and fillllS. Note in particular that effective problem solving activity can occur
without the existence of link 1. For example, implementation of quality control methods
may enable the detection, analysis, and resolution of production problems, without any
initial reduction in inventory. Moreover, long delays may arise in links 3 and 4 (reduction
in WIP following process improvement) without jeopardizing the improvement process.
Indeed, we hypothesize that some firms rely on inventory reduction as a driver for
process improvement, while others utilize different approaches and methods. Cusurnano
(1985) contrasts the inventory-driven production system developed by Toyota with the
-, . —
more conventional MRP system implemented at Nissan.4 In our analysis we test whether
the inventory-productivity linkages represented in Figure 1 are different, on average,
between the Toyota and Nissan al%liates in our sample.
111. Data
The data sample includes a total of 52 Japanese automotive companies, covering
nearly all of the Japanese assemblers and most of the largest parts producers. Findings
are therefore likely to be representative of the Japanese automotive industry. The
historical time series is sufllcient to allow observation of the adoption of JIT methods,
which were introduced in Japan mostly from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.
Firms in the sample can be subdivided as follows. Eight are “core” assemblers
that design, build and sell finished automobiles under their own name. Three are
“contract assemblers,” companies that assemble automobiles as subcontractors for the
core assemblers.j The remaining 41 companies are “first-tier” parts suppliers, i.e., firms
that supply parts directly to the assemblers.
Table 1 lists the parts suppliers in the sample. About half maintain tight links
with either Toyota or Nissan. We assigned suppliers to three groups based their sales
percentage to Toyota and Nissan and their membership in “supplier associations” (Sake,
1996).6 The firms at the top of Table 1, which are all members of Toyota’s regional
“Tokai Kyohokai” association, were assigned to the Toyota group; those at the bottom of
the Table, which all belonged to Nissan’s “Takarakai” association, were assigned to the
4 cu~ummo (1985, pp. 307.3 19) ~omp~es the Niss~ productionsystemwith the one developed by Toyota. While
Nissan adopted some features of JIT manufacturing, “even in the early 1980s, Nissan differed from Toyota in
several areas. It did not employ a ‘pull’ system, ... it produced in relatively large lots, . (and it) chose to rely more
on automation and computers to raise productivity than production-management techniques such as a complete
kanbrm system or the job-cycle rationalization measures and rapid line speeds that Toyota employed.” (p. 307).
5 Two of these firms (Toyota Auto Body and Kanto Auto Works) are Toyota subcontractors; the third (llissan Shatai)
is a Nissan subcontractor.
6 These ~sociations, which me org~ized by he ~emb[ers, serve as mechanisms for information exchange tirrd
technology diffusion.
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Nissan group. These assignments are similar to other group definitions in the literature
(e.g., Dodwell, 1983; Saxonhouse, 1980; Toyo Keiz.ai, 1991). Three firms are closely
afllliated with Isuzu. We classified these three and all remaining suppliers as “others.’”
The data are from Japanese annual financial reports covering the period from
1965 to 1991. The specific data items used in this study are: total company sales, value-
-added, total employment, fixed investment, and work-in-process inventories. These data
are reported on a consistent basis by all publicly-traded manufacturing firms in Japan.*
The data on sales and value added correspond to flows over the fiscal year, while
employment, investment, and inventones are measured as stocks at the end of the year.
Productivity Measure
Labor productivity, defined as real value-added per employee, is the productivity
measure used in this study. (Value added equals the fhn’s sales during the fiscal year,
minus the costs of purchased materials and services.) For each firm and year, the
productivity measure was computed by first converting the firm’s reported value-added
into constant yen (based on the Japanese wholesale price index for transport equipment),
and then dividing by the average of beginning- and end-of-year employment. This yields
real value-added per employee, a standard measure of labor productivity.
Since the 1960s, Japanese automotive firms have scored impressive gains in labor
productivity. Nevertheless, the rate of productivity growth has been diminishing over
time.9 Table 2 gives summary measures
suppliers over the period from 1970 to 1990.
out; Toyota suppliers have also performed
of labor productivity for assemblers and
Toyota’s performance, in particular, stands
better than average, although by a much
7 Many of these “~thers” ~@iciPatc in Toyota’s “Kanto Kyohokai” and Nissan’s “Shohokai” supplier associations,
which have broad membership (Sake, 1994). We classified one company (Topre) as independen~ given its late
. .
entryintotheassociationsof both Toyota and Nissan.
8 The Swcific dab ~~d in this study are from the Analysts’ (hide published annually
Corporation, with supplementary detail for the 1965-1976 period obtained directly
Corporation.
9 Fujimoto and T&eishi (1994) discuss some of the masons for declining productivity
automotive sector.
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the ranks of both assemblers and suppliers, productivity variation
WIP Inventory
Our analysis of JIT focuses on
inventory. Japanese corporate reports give
reductions in each firm’s work-in-process
the value of the WIP inventory at the end of
the fiscal year. Table 3 documents the substantial invento~ reductions that have
occurred in the Japanese automotive sector since the 1960s. Most companies in the
sample cut their WIPlsales ratio by more than 50°/0 during a period of intense activity
from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Table 3 shows that Toyota has operated with very
lean inventories, and key suppliers to Toyota have held much less WIP than the “other”
suppliers. However, the Nissan suppliers in the sample have maintained even lower
average levels of WIP and a superior rate of inventory reduction.
Fixed Capital Investment
Labor productivity normally increases with the amount of fixed investment per
worker. Differences in capital intensity reflect basic differences in production processes,
as well as managerial choices about the degree of process automation. Much of the
productivity growth in Japanese manufacturing since World War II can be attributed to
rising investment per worker (_Norsworthy and Malmquist, 1981; Jorgenson and Kuroda,
1992; van Ark and Pilat, 1993).
To control for the effect of capital investment on labor productivity, we include a
measure of tangible fixed assets per employee in our regression tests. Tangible fixed
assets equals the depreciated value of the firm’s property, plant and equipment at the end
of each fiscal year. This accounting measure was adjusted for inflation and divided by
the firm’s total number of employees to give an estimate of total investment per
employee.
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IV. Periods of Substantial Inventory Reduction
Our first approach to characterizing the comection between WIP reduction and
productivity growth is based on the observation that for most companies in the sample,
there was a well-defined period when major inventory reductions occurred. To identi&
these periods objectively, we applied a simple algorithm to the inventory data. We then
tested whether the periods of inventory reduction coincided with changes in firms’
relative productivity growth and productivity rank. This analysis was limited to parts
suppliers to avoid confounding the effects of inventory reduction with other productivity
differentials related to firm type.
The algorithm for identifying periods of substantial WIP reduction was
implemented as follows. For each firm we prepared the time series on the ratio of WIP
inventory to sales. We then found the earliest year, if any, where the WIP/sales ratio for
each of the next six years fell below a trajectory involving 4°/0 annual reduction, or more
stringently, 8°/0 annual reduction. To establish the end of the period, we identified the
earliest year for which the WIP/sales ratio fell within 20°/0 of the average ratio of the
remaining years of data. 10 While these standards are arbitrary, the results proved robust to
alternative identification procedures. 11
Figure 2 shows the periods of substantial inventory reduction that were identified
by the algorithm. The supplier companies are grouped to reflect their links with the
major assemblers. Within each group, the earlier adopters are listed first. Among the core
assemblers, Toyota, Honda and Nissan began cutting in-process inventories during the
1960s or earliev the smaller assemblers followed in the 1970s. Among the supplier
companies, those allied with Toyota tended to start cutting inventories several years
earlier than most others. For six of the 52 companies, the algorithm was not able to find a
10 one fire, Wken, did not ~gin m~ing sub~tial invento~ reductions until the mid- 1980s. These reductions
continued until the end of sample coverage, so we manually extended Rlken’s period through 1991.
11
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meaningfhl period and it was clear on inspection that those companies did not display a
period of substantial WIP reduction.
For the parts suppliers, we used two methods to test for differential productivity
growth during the inventory reduction periods. The first method utilizes annual
productivity rankings of the companies. The second method involves analysis of relative
productivity growth.
In the first method,
labor productivity within
we ranked all of the parts suppliers in decreasing order of their
each observation year. For the suppliers that satisfied the
criterion for significant inventory reduction, we recorded their percentile productivity
rank in the year prior to the start of substantial WIP reduction and one year after the end
of this period.12
Table 3 reports the results. Of the 41 suppliers in the sample, 35 met the “4’Yo
criterion” for substantial inventory reduction. Of these, 25 increased in productivity rank
during their WIP reduction period, and 10 decreased in rank (significant at the .01 level).
Results are stronger using the more stringent criterion of 8% WIP reduction per annum.
This criterion was met by 33 suppliers, of which 26 increased in rank and 7 decreased
(significant at the .001 level).
Table 3 also reports the analysis of relative productivity growth during periods of
substantial inventory reduction. In each observation year, we computed a relative
productivity growth rate for each firm by subtracting the average productivity growth rate
of suppliers fiwm the value shown for the company. During periods of substantial
inventory reduction, firms exceeded the sample average by about 1.5°/0 to 2.0°/0
11 mere we no ~~d~ Procedures for identifying the periods,so weex~rirnentedwith several algorithms, which
gave similar results. The procedure described here is the simplest of those tested. The tests reported in Table 4 are
robust to changes in the algorithm.
12 We used Me percentile tier ~~ the numerical r~k, ~ the number of suppliers in the sample increases slightly in
the early years.
12
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depending on the criterion used. These productivity growth differentials are highly
significant statistically.
V. Correlation Between Productivity and Inventory Levels
Our second approach to assessing the inventory-productivity link was to use
regression analysis to examine the correlation between labor productivity and the level of
WIP inventory. Given that we have annual data for a cross section of companies (i.e.,
panel data) there are several ways that such a correlation might be observed.
We first investigated whether a negative relation between labor productivity and
the WIP/sales ratio could be identified when companies are compared annually in cross-
section, as demonstrated for the major assemblers in Lieberman (1990). We found strong
correlations of this type for the core assemblers in many observation years. For the parts
suppliers, however, the correlation was significant only in the mid- 1970s, when inventory
levels varied dramatically across the companies.
One explanation for these results is that the suppliers are heterogeneous in their
manufacturing processes, so their “required” levels of WIP inventory differ. This masks
the inventory-productivity relationship when viewed in simple cross-section across firms.
To control for heterogeneous WIP requirements, we estimated a “fixed effects”
regression model where the dependent variable is labor productivity, and each firm has a
separate constant term which captures the differences in firm-specific factors. We also
included time dummies in the regression to allow for annual changes in average industry
productivity. The remaining explanatory variables are the WIP/sales ratio and the level
of capital investment per worker, where the latter serves primarily as a control measure. 13
13 We used the inventory ratio for the end of the observation year. The level of fixed investment is for the beginning
of the year, reflecting plant and equipment which was in place for the full year. All variables were taken in
logarithms, which allows the regression coefllcients to be interpreted as ehsticities.
13
The estimates are shown in Table 5. The error terms in this regression model are
serially correlated; to correct, we used a first-order autoregressive adjustment. The
WIP/sales coefllcient appears highly significant and its magnitude (approximately -.07)
implies that a 10°/0 reduction in WIP was associated with near] y a 10/0 increase in
productivity, other things equal. Tests showed that the coeftlcient was consistent across
time periods and did not differ significantly between assemblers and suppliers or among
the keiretsu company groups. 14
The estimates in Table 5 show that higher capital investment per worker had a
significant effect on labor productivity, as expected. The coefficients suggest that each
10% increase in per capita investment led to about a 1’%to 2!40gain in labor productivity.
One concern in this regression model is the potential for spurious correlation or
simultaneity bias in the WIP/sales coefficients. For example, an unanticipated decline in
sales could lead to a rise in the WIPlsales ratio as well as a decline in productivity. To
check the possibility of bias, we estimated the equation using instrumental variables.
This led to no change in the resulting coefficient estimates, although the standard errors
increased slightly due to the reduced efficiency of the estimator.
W. “causality” Tests
While the findings of the previous sections reveal an association between WIP
and productivity, they give little information on the causal relations outlined in Figure 1.
A deeper assessment requires the application of methods that can shed light on the time
structure of the of the inventory-productivity interaction. In this section we report tests of
“Granger causality,” an approach commonly used in the econometrics literature to
explore the nature of causation between two time-series variables (Granger, 1969; Pierce
14 me ~oefflcient for the Ni~~an~omp~ies W= about h~f the magnitude shown for the full sample, but the difference
was not statistically significant. When the sample was limited to the period after 1970, as in the regressions reported
in the next section, the coetllcient for the contract assemblers fell significantly below that of other firms. One likely
explanation is that the contract assemblers made most of their inventory reductions prior to 1970, as indicated in
Figure 2.
14
and Hau~ 1977; Bishop, 1979; Geweke, Meese and Den& 1983; Bemdt, 1991). Such
tests determine whether lagged information on a variable, X, has any role in explaining
Yt, after controlling for lagged Y and other factors. While these tests can establish
precedence relations among variables that interact over time, they cannot demonstrate
that these effects are causal in the conventional sense.
The theoretical model represented by Figure 1 implies that reductions in WIP may
stimulate productivity gains (links 1, 2 and 5); and conversely, problem solving activities
which lead to productivity improvement may feed back to reduce the level of WIP
inventory (links 2, 3 and 4). Given that the anticipated relations between WIP and
productivity go in both directions, we estimate two related regression models.
Effects of WIP Reduction on Labor Productivity
We first examined whether lagged and contemporaneous changes in WIP
inventory have any ability to explain changes in labor productivity, after controlling for
lagged productivity and changes in sales. The regression equation is:
AVt = CI+ ~4i=1 pi AVt.i + ~4i=o YiASt.i + x4i=o ~i Awt.i + z4i=o Ii AKt-i + Et, (I)
where
AVt is value-added per employee in year t, divided by value-added per employee
in year t-1;
ASt is sales in year t, divided by sales in year t-1;
AWt is WIP inventory at the end of year t, divided by WIP at the end of year t-1;
AKt is fixed investment per employee at the end of year L divided by investment
per employee at the end of year t-1;
and et is a random error term.
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All variables were measured in logarithms, which allows the coefllcients to be interpreted
in terms of growth rates. We include lags through year t-4, given that all coefficients
became insignificant by the fourth year. To accommodate this lag structure, the
dependent variable starts in 1970 for most firms.
Equation 1 can be viewed as a forecasting equation. Changes in labor
productivity for a given firm can be predicted given information on the firm’s historical
productivity trend and the current and lagged growth of sales. The question posed by the
“causality” test is whether this forecast can be significantly improved using additional
information on changes in WIP inventory.
More formally, one would expect a firm’s current productivity growth, AVt , to be
largely determined by its lagged productivity (AVt-i) and by short-term fluctuations in
sales (ASt-i), the latter being typically beyond the control of the firm. The main
hypothesis to be tested is whether, after inclusion of these two series in the regression
equation, changes in WIP inventory (AWt.i) have a detectable impact on productivity
(i.e., the ~i terms in Equation 1 are jointly significant). Moreover, one would expect the
coefficients for ~i to be negative, assuming that reductions in inventory contribute to an
increase in labor productivity.
Equation 1 also incorporates a test for the productivity effects of increasing capital
investment per worker (AKt.i). The Ii coefficients should be positive, assuming that
investment leads to higher labor productivity. These coefilcients may also reveal a
gestation lag for new investment to become effective, as documented previously by Chew
et al. (1990, 1991).
Determinants of Changes in WIP Inventory
Our second regression equation tests for the potential feedback of successfid
problem solving on the level of inventory holdings (i.e., links 2,3 and 4 in Figure 1):
AWt = CY.+ ~4i=1 pi AWt-i + ~4i=o yi ASt-i + ~4i=0 qi AVt-i + ~4i=0 ~i &-i + Et, (2)
16
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where the variables are defined as above. In this equation, changes in WIP inventory
(AW~ are assumed to be determined by lagged inventory changes (AWt.i) and changes in
sales (ASt.i). The primary test of interest is whether reductions in WIp me preceded by
productivity gains (i.e., the qi terms in Equation 2 are negative and significant).’s
Moreover, it is possible that new investment may disrupt the manufacturing process in
the short term, leading to some increase in the need for WIP (i.e., positive coei%cients for
Ai).
Given the system of simultaneous relationships represented by equations 1 and 2,
estimation by ordinary least squares may lead to biased estimates of the coefficients. In
particular, AWt and AVt are endogenous. To avoid erroneous estimates, the potential
simultaneity bias must be tested, and if necessary, corrected.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in Labor Productivity
Estimates of equation 1 are reported in Tables 6a and 6b. The first three
regressions cover the full sample of 52 companies; all remaining regressions are for
groups of firms as indicated. The OLS estimates were found to be free of simultaneity
bias, based on a Hausman test.]b However, the error terms were found to be
heteroskedastic; as a correction, we report t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent
(robust) standard errors.
The regressions in Table 6a show that as expected, productivity was strongly
influenced by contemporaneous changes in
controlling for sales and productivity trends,
in productivity. 17 In the regressions for
sales, ASt. Moreover, they show that after
changes in WIP inventory preceded changes
the fill sample (6.2 and 6.3) the AWt.l
15 our imPlicit ~~umption is that the lags ~sociated witi link 2 in Figure 1 are very short.
16 We aPP]ied the fo[lowing Ha~sm~ test for simultaneity bias (Bemdt, 1991, pp. 379-380): Fitted values of AWt
were obtained from reduced form regressions on the exogenous and predetermined variables, and these values were
added as explanatory variables in equations 6.2 and 6.3. The fitted values were not significant in these regressions,
indicating that the hypothesis of simultaneity bias in the AWt coefficients can be rejected.
i 7 The AW ~oeffl~lents me jointly signific~t at the .001 level based on m F test or Wdd test.
17
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coefllcients are negative and highly significant, implying that inventory reductions were
followed by productivity gains, with a lag of about one year. The AWt and AWt.2
coefficients are negative but smaller in magnitude, denoting some productivity gains in
the year of inventory reduction and two years after. The AWt-3 and AWt.4 coefficients
are insignificant, indicating the absence of Ii@her impact after two years. The total effect
is given by the sum of the AWt coefficients, which is about -0.10. This implies that a
10VOreduction in WIP inventory contributed to about a 1’Moincrease in productivity on
average across the sample.
Regression 6.3 includes the AK terms, which capture the productivity effects of
changes in investment per worker. The AK coefllcients, which are jointly significant,
suggest a gestation lag of one or two years for new investment to become effective. The
coefficients sum to about 0.20, which implies that a 10°/0 increase in capital per worker
led ultimately to about a 2V0increase in labor productivity. The addition of these controls
for capital investment has no appreciable effect on the WIP coefficients.
We performed tests to determine whether the effects of WIP reduction were
consistent across the company groupings. In Table 6a the sample is broken down into
assemblers and suppliers; in Table 6b the sample is divided into three groups: ( 1) Toyota
affiliates, (2) Nissan affiliates, and (3) “Others.”
Some minor differences between assemblers and suppliers are shown in Table 6a.
There is evidence that the assemblers had a slightly longer gestation lag between
inventoty reduction and productivity gains. Their AW coefficients remain significant into
the second year, with fi,uther possible effects in the third year. Moreover, the total
magnitude of effect (sum of the coefllcients) is larger on average for the assemblers than
for the suppliers. These differences were confirmed by tests (shown in Table 7) to
determine whether sets of coef%cients differed significantly between groups. 18The test
18 We implemented these tests by constraining the coefficients of interest to be identical between the two groups being
compared, while allowing all other coefficients to differ between the groups. The sum of squared residuals in these
constrained regressions, relative to the unconstrained values shown in Table 6, provides the basis for the tests.
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that compares the set of AWt-i coel%cients between assemblers and suppliers has a p-
value of 0.036, indicating that the hypothesis of identical coefficients can be rejected at
the 5% level.
Table 6b shows larger differences between groups defined on the basis of
company afllliation. Regressions 6.8 and 6.9 suggest that the lag between WIP reduction
and productivity gain was about six months shorter for the Toyota group than for other
companies. Moreover, Regressions 6.10 and 6.11, which are limited to the Nissan
affiliates, reveals that these firms had no significant productivity gains following
reductions in WIP. These differences among company groups are confirmed by the test
statistics in Table 7.19 The contrast between Toyota and Nissan groups is consistent with
differences in the operations practices of the two assemblers, as discussed by Cusurnano
(1985).
A graphic illustration of these results is provided in Figure
impact of WIP reduction on productivity (obtained by summing the
Table 6b). The Toyota and “other” company groupings display
3, which plots the
AW coefllcients in
similar cumulative
productivity effects, although the impact of WIP reduction is more immediate and
perhaps more persistent for the Toyota companies. By comparison, the absence of such
effects for the Nissan afilliates is striking.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Tables 8a and 8b give the regression estimates of equation 2 on the determinants
of inventory chartges.20 While these regressions explain only a small proportion of the
Table 7 gives significance ”levels obtained using the Wald test wcommended by Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983).
Results of F-tests were very similar.
19 Differences be~een the _foyou ~d Niss~ groupswe significantat the 5% levei, as are the differences between
the Toyota group and “Others,” Differences between the Nissan group and “Others” are significant at the 1?4.level.
20 we te5ted the5e OLs ~e~ressions for simul~eity bim in the AVCoefflciertts,using a Hausman test analogous to the
one described in footnote 18. Results indicated that the OLS estimates were unbiased. Although tests showed the
absence of significant heteroskedasticity, we report t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors,
as in Table 6.
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annual fluctuation in WIP, a number of significant patterns are indicated. The AWt-i
coefilcients are generally negative, revealing a tendency for deviations from trend to
return to the trend level. This pattern is especially strong for the Toyota group, where
most of the inventory adjustment occurred in the first year, much fmter than what is
shown for the other companies. There was also a strong tendency, particularly in the case
of part suppliers, for changes in WIP to track recent changes in sales, as would be
expected. The ASt-i coefficients in regressions 8.2 and 8.3 sum to approximately unity,
implying that increases in sales were ultimately met by roughly proportionate increases in
WIP.21 Most of this adjustment occurred in the year that sales increased.
The conceptual framework outlined in Section II implies that WIP reductions
should follow improvements in productivity, although the lag time for adjustment may
vary. The regressions in Table 8 provide mixed evidence of such effects. While the AVt-i
coefficients are generally negative, as expected, none of the individual terms are
statistically significant except in the regressions for the Toyota group. (The tests in Table
7 confirm that the Toyota group coefficients are significantly different from the rest of the
sample.) Compared with other companies, the Toyota affiliates made faster and more
consistent reductions in inventory following improvements in the manufacturing process.
Figure 4 illustrates this finding. For the Toyota companies on average, a 1YOproductivity
gain was followed within about a year by a 1.7°A reduction in WIP. Other firms also cut
their inventories over time (as indicated by the summary ratios presented earlier in Table
2), but without such a tight coupling.
The AKt.i coefilcients in Table 8 provide additional tiorrnation on the
determinants of WIP. The coefficient for capital investments made during the
observation year is strongly positive, implying that WIP inventories rose in response to
new investment. This may reflect intentional steps to increase inventory buffers, or
alternatively, unanticipated disruption on the factory floor. For the Toyota and Nissan-
2 I Whi]e ~le~ d~line~ ~c=ion~ly occurred, tie predominant Eend was of increa,$ingsales over the sample period.
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af131iated companies, this post-investment build up seems to have dissipated fairly
quickly, as indicated by the negative coefficients for AKt. 1and AKt.2.
VII. Discussion and Perspective
The preceding sections of this paper present various tests for a connection
between WIP inventory and productivity, based on historical data for the Japanese
automotive sector. In this section we consider the findings in broader perspective.
All the tests show a strong and statistically significant comection between
inventory and productivity. None, however, can fully distinguish among the causal links
shown in Figure 1. As illustrated in the Figure, an association between inventory and
productivity can arise in several ways. One chain of causality begins with successful
problem solving, which leads to productivity gains (link 2) and subsequent inventory
reduction (links 3 and 4). In this case WIP reduction plays no role in stimulating
productivity, but is purely a response to successful problem solving. Could this be the
dominant chain of causality underlying the empirical results? The tests in Sections IV
and V are silent on this issue, but the analysis in Section VI is informative. One piece of
evidence is the finding of a relatively weak connection between productivity gains and
subsequent inventory reductions, except within the Toyota group. By comparison, the
links in the opposite direction (WIP reductions preceding productivity gains) appear
larger and more pervasive. These precedence relations suggest that the dominant path
leads from WIP reduction to productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
Ambiguity nevertheless remains with respect to the exact mechanisms linking
inventory reduction to productivity gains. To what extent does it occur via links 1 and 2
(embodying the “rocks in the river” metaphor for JIT), as opposed to link 5 (inventory
reduction economizes on working capital and other inputs)? We expect the former to be
more important, for a number of reasons. Schonberger (1982) and others have argued
that the benefits associated with link 5, which are
costs, are comparatively small. In the Japanese
primarily savings in inventory holding
automotive industry we estimate that
21
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these holding cost economies amounted to at most one-third of the average productivity
gain.22 Mo~ver, most of the holding cost savings would be immediate, whereas we
typically observe the productivity gain with a lag.
These assessments are based on the assumption that the WIP-productivity
connection reflects the outcome of successful problem solving activity. To some extent,
though, the observed correlations could stem fkom factory setbacks. Unanticipated
problems may cause a temporary drop in productivity (link 2) and a build-up of WIP
inventory (links 3 and 4). While such effects may be present in our data, they are likely
to be comparatively small. One reason is that such setbacks should have an immediate
impact on both productivity and inventory, whereas the analysis shows significant lags.
Moreover, in the Japanese automotive industry the strong prevailing trend was toward
WIP reduction and productivity growth, rather than vice versa.
One issue that warrants greater discussion is the precise interpretation of the time
structure associated with the coefficients in the Granger causality tests. Given that some
variables are end-of-year stocks while others are annual flows, a shift of one-half year is
appropriate in some cases .23 In Table 6, for example, the lag between WIP reduction and
productivity gain was likely to have been about six months shorter than what would
otherwise be implied by the regression coefllcients. Suitable adjustment suggests that
productivity gains were almost immediate for the Toyota companies, as compared with a
lag of about one-half year for non-Toyota suppliers, and one year for assemblers. In
Table 8, the flow variables such as AV are shifted by six months in the opposite direction.
22 [n our -P]e, tie WIp/v~ue.~ded ratio pe~ed at 16.3% in 1967, falling MOW 1W. from 1977 onward.
Assuming a 15% ratio and a 15% annual holding COSLa 10% reduction in WIP amounts to a holding cost savings
equal to 0.225% of value-added. This is less than one-third of the estimated productivity gain.
23 Assume for pupses of illus~tion mat a reduction in WIp inventory [cads to an immediate gain in productivity.
The dependent variable in Table 6, AVt, is the change in value-added per worker (a flow measure) between year t- 1
and year t. The explanatory variable, AWt, is the changeirrthestockof WIPinventov,rne=uredfromtheendof
year t-1 to the end of year t. A reduction in W[P made at the midpoint of year t would be foIlowed by an immediate
rise in the firm’s value-added, but the increase in productivity, as recorded by AVt, would app= half in yew t md
half in the next year. In the regression analysis of AVtone would observe coetlicients of equal magnitude for AWt
and AWt. 1, with coefficients of zero for the additional lagged tern. This is approximately what is shown for the
Toyota group (regressions 6.8 and 6.9).
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Here, the coefficients for AVt and AVt. 1, which are statistically significant for the Toyota
group, should be interpreted as reflecting lags of 0.5 and 1.5 years between productivity
gains and subsequent inventory reductions.~4
To put the findings in perspective, it is helpfi.d to compare the magnitude of
productivity gains attributable to inventory reduction with the gains attributable more
broadly to other factors. The WIP coefllcients in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that as a rough
approximation, each 10°/0 reduction in WIP contributed to art average increase of about
1‘?40in labor productivity. Producers that made substantial inventory reductions (as
identified by our algorithm) cut their WIPlsales ratio by about two-thirds, on average.
Combining these estimates leads to the conclusion that for such firms, the aggregate
productivity gain attributable to inventory reductions was typically about 10’%o.In other
words, labor productivity was 10°/0 higher at the end of the sample period, as compared
with the hypothetical case where the firm would have made no inventory reductions at
all.?j
While a 10?40productivity differential is appreciable, it is important to recognize
that from 1970 to 1980, when most of the inventory reductions were occurring, labor
productivity for the sample companies grew at an average amual rate of 9’?40.Thus, the
estimated effects of inventory reduction correspond to less than one-tenth of the total
productivity gains recorded during the 1970s.
The cumulative impact of WIP reduction on labor productivity can also be
compared with the effects of increased capital investment. From 1970 to 1980, real fixed
capital per worker rose by 5.1 YO per year on average across the sample. Using an
elasticity of 0.15, which is suggested by the regression coefficients in Tables 5 and 6, this
24This~ai~e~tic Possibilityhat Avt+~shouldbe inCIU&das an explanatory variable in Table 8. When tested, this
measure had a negative coetllcient that was weakly significant but comparatively small.
25 A similm compu~[ion ~ be m~e using the estimates of relative labor productivity growth in Table 4. Firms that
made substantial inventory reductions (based on the 40/o criterion) experienced productivity growth during this
period that was, on average, about 1.5% above the growth rate of other firms. Multiplying this figure by an average
reduction period of about 6-7 years (consistent with Figure 2) yields a total differential productivity gain of about
1oYO.
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increase in capital intensity translates into a labor productivity gain of about 10°/0over the
course of the decade. Thus, the productivity gain that can be linked to inventory
reduction during the 1970s may have been roughly the same magnitude as the gain from
increased capital investment. Taken together, these estimates imply that most of the rapid
growth in Japanese automotive productivity during the 1970s was derived from
manufacturing process improvements not directly related to capital investment or
inventory reduction.2s
VIII. Conclusions
The findings of this study shed light on the linkages between WIP inventory and
productivity. We have considered alternate paths of causality and have derived
quantitative estimates of effects. The results are complementary with the large body of
case study evidence on the implementation of JIT manufacturing. Indeed, our work
demonstrates that quantitative analysis of public company data can provide insights for
researchers and practitioners in operations management, a field with little tradition of
statistical data analysis.
Our findings suggest that for most companies in our sample, inventory reductions
were followed by productivity gains. We find more limited evidence of effects in the
opposite direction. In quantitative terms, each 10°/0 reduction in inventory led to an
average gain of about 10/0in labor productivity, with a lag of about one year. Firms that
made substantial inventory reductions enjoyed a period of annual productivity growth
significantly higher than that of other companies on average. Typically, these firms also
saw an increase in their productivity rank.
While these effects were widespread in the Japanese auto industry, inter-firm
differences are apparent, particularly between the Toyota and Nissan groups. For the
26 During the 1970s various manufacturing practices, such as quality circles and total quality control, became widely
adopted in the Japanese automotive sector.
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firms aflliated with Toyota the inventory-productivity linkage appears very tight:
productivity gains followed quickly after inventory reductions, and inventories were cut
soon afler the achievement of productivity gains. For the Nissiin tilliates, however,
neither of these effects was observed. “Other” companies in our sample showed a
significant link in one direction only (from inventory to productivity), and with a longer
lag than that detected for the Toyota group. Despite these differences in estimated
effects, over the two decades of sample coverage most of the companies in the sample
achieved major inventory reductions, and all attained substantial productivity growth.
Taken jointly, these observations support our hypothesis that many Japanese firms relied
on inventory reduction as a driver for process improvement, although some utilized other
approaches and methods.
While broadly consistent with prior research, these findings offer new and
quantitative insights regarding the effects of JIT implementation. Nevertheless,
important caveats apply. The findings presented here are aggregate estimates, far
removed from details of the shop floor where JIT implementation actually takes place.
Such details undoubtedly matter, and the estimates obtained in this study are averages
that mask heterogeneity across individual firms, plants and processes.
Most importantly, it is well known that inventory reduction is only one
component of JIT; related activities (such as setup time reduction and statistical process
control) are essential. It may be impossible, and perhaps not meaningful, to distinguish
the impact of WIP reduction from that of these other activities. Indeed, the WIP
reductions observed in this study may serve in part as a proxy for these other activities,
with which they are correlated. Thus, the quantitative findings of this study should be
kept in perspective and regarded as rough benchmarks only.
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Value Added per Employee
\ d
(1) ~ the “rocks” by lox the “water:” (2) solution of ~S to mo~: . . .
l [factual WIP inventory is cut to near or below “required” WIP, problems in the l Reduced rework& scrap (less material & labor cost).
manufacturing process (leading to variabilityy, discontinuity or waste) wi H be detected. * Reduced setup times (higher machine utilization and
l When WIP is low, the delays between the occurrence of a problem and the detection of a less labor cost).
problem become shorter. l Reduced machine ftilures (less worker and equipment
idleness and hence higher utilization).
(3) ~ to reductism
l
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red WIP invq
Reduced setup times and costs allow
smaller lot sizes.
Improved machine maintenance deereases
the need for buffer inventories.
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need for buffer inventories.
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of actual WIP:
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“CORE”ASSEMBLERS
TOYOTA
HONDA
NISSAN
DA[HATSU
MAZDA
FUJI HEAVY lND.
Isuzu
SUZUKI
TOYOTABODY*
AISIN SEIKI
KOITO
PACIFIC
FUTABA INDUSTRIAL
SHIROKI
TOKAI
OWARI SEIKI
AISAN INDUSTRY
NIPPONDENSO
TOYODA GOSEI
CHUO SPRING I x x ~ ~ x
ilSSAN Suppliers
IKEDA BUSAAN*]
KANSEI
ICHIKOH
TOCHIGI FUJ[
CALSONIC
FUJI KIKO
JIDOSHA DENKI KOGYO
KASAI KOGYO
ATSUG1 UNISIA
DAIKIN MFG
NISSAN SHATAI
[SUZU Suppliers
TOKYO RADIATOR
PRESS KOGYO
JIDOSHA BUHIN KOGYO
THER Suppliers
TOYO RADIATORI
M[KUN[
TOPY INDUSTRIES
SHOWA MFG.
AKEBONO BRAKE
NIPPON PISTON
NOK
STANLEY
ZEXEL
TOPRE
NIPPON CABLE SYSTEM x
KEHIN SEIK[
RIKEN
KAYABA
NHK
TOKICOI
~Yearsduring which the inventory reduction wtisfidthecriteria oftiealgorithm for4%annual reduction,
but not those ot’ the more stringent algorithm.
mYears during which the inventory reduction satisfied thecriteriaofboth .Igorithrns(ann.al reduction > 8%).
1As identified by algorithms described in text
“ Contract assembler
x Data not available for this year.
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Figure 3. Productivity Change Following WIP Reduction*
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lBased on AW coefficients in Regressions 6.9, 611, and 6.13.
Figure 4. Change in WIP Following Productivity Gain**
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Table 1:
Parts Suppliers in Sample
“---~v
. .
P------
IAkin SeikiFutaba Industrial
INippondensoTokai Rlka
Aisan Industry
Toyoda Gosei
Shiroki
Chuo Spring
Stanley Electric
Toyo Radiator
Nippon Cable System
Akebono Brake
Kayaba Industry
NHK Spring
NOK
Tokico
Riken
Nippon Piston Ring
Topy Industries
Showa
Jidosha Buhin Kogyo
Keihin Seiki
Mikuni
Tokyo Radiator
Press Kogyo
Topre
Zexel
Daikin Manufacturing
Ichikoh
Tochigi Fuji Sangyo
Jidosha Denki Kogyo
Calsonic
Fuji Univance
Fuji Kiko
Ikeda Bussan
Kansei
Kasai Kogyo
Atsugi Unisia
1990 Sales Distribution
0/0 Tovota ‘A Nissan
66.5 0
54.6 0
53.4 0
63 0
73.7 0
60 0
57.3 2.6
44 0
44.2 0
38 15
19.4 0
15 0
13,8 0
12.5 5.7
12.2 14.9
15 15
15 15
15 15
7 23
3.8 8.4
NA NA
NA NA
o 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 1.4
0 21
0 21.8
0 10.8
17.2 57.7
0 44.4
0 73.1
0 79.4
0 70.3
0 69.6
0 79
0 82.2
0 74.2
0 78.2
Supplier Association
TT TK NT Typical Products
x Transmissions Brake cylinders
x Mufflers Canisters
x Pistons&Piston pins Hydraulic tappets
x Switches Seat Belts
x Fuel injector Throttle body
x Hydraulic hoses Rubber mountings
x Window frames Window regulators
x Valve springs Control cables
x Tire valves Valve cores
x Automotive lighting
x Ak compressors Bolts&nuts
x Head lamps Sealed beam units
x Radiators Oil Coolers
x Control cables
z
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Disc brake ass’y
Shock absorbers
Leaf springs
Oil seals
Shock absorbers
Pistons
Piston rings
Wheels-steel
Shock absorbers
Front&rear axles
Carburetors
z Carburetors
Radiators
Frame
z Miscellaneous
Drum brake ass’y
Hydraulic jacks
Coil springs
Mechanical seals
Drum brake
Piston rings
Cylinder liners
Wheels-light alloy
Suspension struts
Propeller shafts
Fuel pumps
Oil pumps
Oil coolers
Ade casing
Fuel injection system Air-condition system
x Transmission parts Clutch rovers
x x Lamps Rear view mirrors
x Propeller shafts Oil pumps
x Wiper motor Wiper arms & blades
x Radiators Catalytic converters
x Transmissions Timing gears
x Steering column Seat belt
x Seats Interior trim parts
x Digital displays Instruments
x Door trim Rear quarter trim
x Pistons&Piston pins Hydraulic tappets
x = Joined association prior to 1975.
z = Joined association after 1975.
lT=Tokai Kyohokai, TK=Kanto Kyohokai (Toyota Associations)
NT=Takarakai (Nissan Association)
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Table 2.
Historical Data on Labor Productivity*
Value Added per Employee Average Annual
(Millions of 1980 yen) Percent Change
1970 1980 1990 1970-80 1980-90
Core Assemblers
All Core Assemblers (8) 3.7 7.9 12.0 7.9?40 4.370
Toyota 5.5 11.0 20.0 7.3% 6.1%
Nissan 4.5 9.3 12.7 7.6% 3.1%
Contract Assemblers (3) 3.5 7.0 11.8
Suppliers
Toyota Suppliers (11 ) 2.9 6.6 10.8
Nissan Suppliers (11 ) 2.7 6.0 9.7
Other Sumliers (19) 2.8 6.7 10.3
7.2% 5.4%
8.670 5.1?40
8.6% 4.9?Z0
9.2°k 4.4?40
Table 3.
Historical Data on WIP/Sales*
Core Assemblers
All Core Assemblers (8)
Toyota
Nissan
Contract Assemblers (3)
Suppliers
Toyota Suppliers (11 )
Nissan Suppliers (11 )
I Other Suppliers (19)
WIP as % of Sales
1970 1980 1990
3.5% 1.5?fo 1.4!740
0.9”4) 0.4% 0.5%
1.9?0 1.1?40 1 .4!A0
1.2% 0.9% 1,1%
3.5°!4 1.7”h 2. O’?AO
3.3% 1.6?40 1.3!40
6.4?40 3.470 2.6%
Percent Charme I
1970-80 1980-90
-55.3Y0 -11.8?40
-58.9Y0 39.970
-43.0% 25.4~o
-27.2% 23.7~o
-51.7% 17.4?40
-52.970 -19.570
-47.2’%0 -21.3%
*Data are simple averages across sample companies within each of the groups shown
(Number of firms in group listed in parentheses.)
Table 4.
Tests for Productivity Changes During Periods of Substantial Inventory Reduction
Total number of suppliers in sample 41 41
Minimum requirement for “substantial inventory reduction” 4% 8%
(per annum reduction over 6 year period)
Number of suppliers exhibiting “substantial inventory reduction” 35 33
Number whose productivity rank increased 25 26
Number whose productivity rank decreased 10 7
P-value (binomial test) .01 .001
Differential productivity growth rate 1.51’?40 1.98?40
(average, per annum, during inventory reduction period)
P-value (t-test) .01 .001
..
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Table 5.
Regression Analysis of Labor Productivity
DependentVariable: Value-addedper Employee
a 42 Q Q
Estimation method” OLS AR 1 AR 1 AR 1
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm dummies yes yes yes no
Investment per Employee 0.290 0.139 0.148 0.132
(16.4) (5.9) (6.3) (5.8)
WIP/Sales ratio -0.068 -0.068 -0.061
(-6.3) (-5.8) (-5.6)
R-squared 0.968 -- -- ‘-
SSR 16.11 9.00 9.26 9.76
D.W. 0.65 1.9 1.88 2.05
Rho -- 0.721 0.719 0.887
Nr. of ohs. 1265 1265 1265 1265
9.3
Iv
yes
yes
0.250
(13.4)
-0.071
(-3.7)
0.960
11.74
0.72
--
1265
l Estimation methods are: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Maximum Likelihood
First-Order Autoregressive (AR1 ), and InstrumentalVariables (IV).
For IV, the instruments include all the explanatory variables except for
WIP/Sales, plus lagged values of investment per employee, number of
employees, and WI P/Sales, (Latter measure lagged two years or more. )
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
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a
Av(-1 )
AV(-2)
AV(-3)
AV(-4)
AS
AS(-1 )
AS(-2)
AS(-3)
AS(-4)
AVV
AW(-1 )
AW(-2)
AW(-3)
AW(-4)
AK
AK(-1 )
AK(-2)
AK(-3)
AK(-4)
R-squared
SSR
logL
Durbin-Watson
nr. of ohs.
Table 6a.
Regression Analysis of Annual Productivity Changes
De~endent variable: AV(t
All firms
6J62!U
0.02 l * 0.02 ** 0,01
(3.88) (3.70) (1.29)
0.02 0.01 -0.02
(0.39) (0.17) (-0.37)
-0.18 ** -0.17 l * -0.19 **
(4.21) (-4,12) (-4.38)
0.04 0.04 0.01
(1.16) (1.11) (0.41)
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.69)
0.67 ** 0.68 l * 0.69 **
(21.03) (20.09) (20.41 )
-014 ** -0.09 -0.07
(-2.68) (-1 .59) (-1 .34)
0.09 * 0.09 l 0.08 l
(2.41) (2.2a) (2.04)
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(-1 16) (-1.20) (-1.10)
0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.11) (0.50) (0.44)
-0.02 -0.02
(-1 60) (-1 78)
-006 l * -0.07 l *
(-4 68) (-5 26)
-001 -0.01
(-0.88) (-1.31)
0.01 0.00
(0.52) (0.42)
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.22)
0.03
(1.15)
0.11 l *
(3,91)
0.06 **
(2.85)
0.02
(1.10)
0.00
(-0.20)
0.437 0.458 0.476
5.907 5.685 5.498
1326 1347 1366
2.00 2.00 1.97
1107 1107 1107
= mowth in labor wodutilvitv
All Assemblers
Uti
0.02 0.01
(0.98) (0.54)
-0.10 -0.11
(-0.73) (-0.79)
-0.24 l -0.23 l
(-2.24) (-2.05)
-0.02 -0.05
(-0.26) (-0.69)
-0.02 -0.03
(-0.74) (-1 .09)
0,92 l * 0.94 l *
(12.41)
-0.05
(-0,40)
0.08
(0.80)
-0.06
(-0.77)
0.04
(0,58)
0.00
(-0,01)
(12.45)
-0.02
(-0.19)
0,06
(0.57)
-0.05
(-0.64)
0.05
(0.74)
0.00
(o 22)
-0,06 l * -0.07 **
(-3.28) (-3.53)
-0.06 l * -006 l *
(-2.93) (-3.27)
-0.04 -0,03
(-1 .72) (-1 ,56)
0.00 -0.03
(0.00) (-1,34)
-0.01
(-o. 15)
0.15 l
(2.46)
-0.01
(-0.08)
-0,03
(-0.50)
-0.03
(-0.44)
0.520 0.534
1.626 1.581
259 262
1.99 1.99
240 240
.
All Suppliers
au
0.02 l * 0.01
(3.98) (1.45)
0.04 0.00
(0.67) (0.01)
-0.15 l * -0.17 l *
(-3.25) (-3.75)
0.05 0.03
(1 .48) (0.90)
-0.02 -0.02
(-0.67) (-0.84)
0.62 ** 0.63 l *
(16.35)
-0.09
(-1 .42)
0.08
(1 ,69)
-0.03
(-0.92)
0.01
(0.27)
-0.02
(-1.31)
(16.72)
-0.07
(-1.26)
0.07
(1.51)
-0.03
(-0.86)
0.01
(0.20)
-0.02
(-1 62)
-0.06 l * -0.07 **
(-3.70) (-4 18)
0.00 0.00
(0.25) (-008)
0.01 0.01
(0.92) (0.81)
0.00 0.01
(0.00) (1.11)
0.04
(1.52)
0.10 **
(3.37)
0.06 **
(2.80)
0.03
(1.32)
-0.01
(-0.34)
0.466 0.488
3.786 3.630
1125 1144
2.00 1.97
867 867
“Significant at the 5V0 level, two-tailed test.
**Significant at the 1%!.level, two-tailed test.
...
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a
AV(-1)
AV(-2)
AV(-3)
AV(-4)
AS
AS(-1 )
AS(-2)
AS(-3)
AS(-4)
A~
AW(-I )
Ah’V(-2)
AL’V(-3)
AW(-4)
AK
AK(-1 )
AK(-2)
AK(-3)
AK(+)
R-squared
SSR
logL
Durbin-Watson
nr. of ohs.
Table 6b.
Regression Analysis of Annual Productivity Changes
.,
Toyota Group
au
0.03 l * 0.02
(3.16) (1 .95)
-0.05 -0.08
(-0.81) (-1.14)
-0.14 * -0.15 l
(-2.05) (-2.38)
0,00 -0.02
(0.04) (-0.28)
0.02 0.01
(0,92) (0.56)
0.62 ** 0.62 **
(8.75) (8.55)
-0.15 l -012
(-2.39) (-1 .78)
012 ‘ 0.10
(2.00) (1.66)
-0.07 -0.08
(-1.19) (-1 .22)
0.05 0.04
(1.06) (0.89)
-0.05 l * -0.06 l *
(-356) (-3.63)
-006 ** -0.06 l *
(-3,63) (-3.75)
-0.02 -003
(-1.19) (-1 48)
0.00 000
(-o. 17) (-o 10)
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.22)
-0.02
(-0.41 )
0.06
(1.06)
0.09 l
(2.22)
0.04
(1.17)
0.02
(0.37)
0.422 0.446
0.983 0.943
419 425
2.00 1.99
293 293
DeDendent variable: AV(t) = growth-in
Nissan Group
fLlL?Q12
0.03 l * 0.02 *
(2.68) (1.99)
0.09 0.06
(1.19) (0.85)
-0.21 ‘* -0.20 l
(-2.61) (-2.50)
0.04 0.03
(0.61) (0.38)
-0.01 -0.01
(-0.46) (-0.50)
0.61 l * 0.61 l *
(10,75) (10.43)
-0.26 l * -0.25 **
(-3.95) (-3.92)
0.14 0.11
(1.80) (1.47)
0.03 0.02
(0.56) (0.36)
0.00 0.00
(-0.07) (0.07)
-0.01 -0.01
(-0.71) (-0.25)
000 0.00
(-0.12) (0.00)
0.04 * 0.02
(2.08) (1.15)
-0.01 -0.02
(-0.43) (-0.84)
0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0,69)
-0.03
(-0.54)
0.05
(0.93)
0.11 l *
(2.60)
0.03
(0.64)
-0.03
(-0.86)
0.501 0.523
1.080 1.032
346 352
1.95 1.93
261 261
Ibor productivity
Others
QJ2U.3
0.02 l * 0.00
(2.47) (0.46)
-0.01 -0.04
(-0.08) (-0.46)
-0.16 l -0.18 l *
(-2.51) (-2.71)
0.04 0.00
(0.80) (0.09)
-0.01 -0.01
(-0.1 8) (-0.26)
0.70 ** 0.72 l *
(14.50) (15,40)
0.01 0.02
(0.17) (0.32)
0.04 0.04
(0.63) (0.63)
-0.07 -0.05
(-1.33) (-0.89)
-0.01 -0.02
(-0.33) (-0.45)
0.00 0.00
(0.08) (-0.24)
-0.09 ** -0.10 **
(-4.24) (-4.66)
-0.03 -0.03
(-1 .35) (-1.54)
0.02 0.02
(1,22) (1.09)
0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.19)
0.09 l
(2.32)
0.12 l *
(3.40)
0.02
(0.58)
0.02
(0.70)
-0.02
(-0.50)
0.504 0.527
3.287 3.132
632 846
1.97 1.96
553 553
‘Significant at the 50/. level, two-tailed test
l*Significant at the 1Y. level, two-tailed teSt.
-1
,:
Table 7.
Tests of Equality Between Groups*
Assemblers Toyota Group Toyota Group Nissan Group
versus versus versus versus
Suppliers Nissan group “Othed Group “Other” Group
Productivity change folIowing change in WIP
(AW coefficients in Table 6) .036 .013 .027 .001
Change in WIP following change in Productivity
(AVcoefficients in Table 8) .259 .001 .000 .113
lTests were performed by constraining the coefficients indicated (for years t through t-3) to be identical between groups,
with all other coeftlcients allowed to differ. Table gives the p-level by which the null hypothesis of coefficient equality
can be rejected, based on a Wald test. (F-test results were very similar.)
aAW(-I )
AVV(-2)
AW(-3)
AW(-4)
AS
AS(-1 )
AS(-2)
AS(-3)
AS(-4)
AV
AV(-I )
AV(-2)
AV(-3)
AV(-4)
AK
AK(-1 )
AK(-2)
AK(-3)
AK(4)
R-squared
SSR
logL
Durbin Watson
nr. of ohs.
Table 8a.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Dependent variable: AW
All firms
Utuui
-0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(-1.46) (-0.93) (-1 ,77)
-0.15 ** -0.16 l * -0,15 l *
(-3.92) (-4.20) (4.00)
-0.10 l * -0.11 l * -0.10
(-2.61)
-0.04
(-1 .09)
0.03
(0.89)
O 69
(8.84)
0.04
(0.56)
-0.01
(-011)
017
(2.15)
0.06
(o. 79)
(-2.69)
-0.04
(-1 .00)
0.03
(0.77)
0.82
(6.72)
0.09
(0.80)
-0.03
(-0.22)
0.23
(2.07)
0.05
(0.54)
-0.19
(-1.59)
-0.09
(-0.89)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.09
(-0.91 )
0.00
(0,00)
(-2.41)
-0.06
(-1 .52)
0.03
(0.96)
0.81
(6.66)
0.06
(0.48)
0.03
(0.25)
0.22
(1.98)
0.04
(0.43)
-0.20
(-1 75)
-0.12
(-1 10)
-0,05
(-0.46)
-0,08
(-0,86)
-0.01
(-0.14)
0.32 **
(4.42)
-0.06
(-0.87)
-0.01
(-0.05)
0.15 l
(2.14)
-0.10
(-1 .54)
0.123 0.128 0.152
56.13 55.82 54.22
79.7 82.7 98.7
1.99 1.99 2.00
1107 1107 1107
I = change in WIP inventory
All Assemblers
&If!&
0.04 0.04
(0.94) (0.74)
-0.22 l * -0.21 **
(-2.91)
-0.05
(-0.51)
-0.04
(-0.44)
0.14
(1.98)
0.37
(1,34)
0.08
(0.32)
-0.52
(-1.51)
0.07
(0.24)
-0.08
(-0.41)
0.00
(-0.01)
0.08
(0.42)
0.23
(1.02)
0.17
(0.80)
0.00
(0.00)
(-2.63)
-0.03
(-0.28)
-0,05
(-0.58)
0.15
(2.05)
0.36
(1 .28)
-0.02
(-0.06)
-0.41
(-1.18)
0.05
(0.16)
-0.06
(-0.29)
0.04
(0.22)
O 08
(0.41)
0.15
(0.62)
0.22
(1.01)
0.23
(1.83)
0.39
(1.63)
-0.25
(-1 .32)
-0.14
(-0.71)
0.13
(0.64)
-0.18
(-0,91)
0.147 0.175
14.75 14.26
-5.8 -1.7
2.07 2.10
240 240
All suppliers
u L7
-0.03 -0.05 **
(-1 .62) (-2.53)
-0.11 -0.10
(-2.44) (-2.32)
-0.14 ** -0.13 l *
(-3,59) (-3.51)
-0.01 -0.03
(-0, 17) (-0.66)
-0.02 -001
(-0.53) (-0.37)
0.91 0.91
(6.49) (6.67)
0.08 0.05
(0.60) (0.36)
0.08 0.13
(0,62) (1.03)
0.26 0.26
(2.17) (211)
0.12 010
(1,23) (1.05)
-0.21 -0,24
(-130) (-1 59)
-0.16 -0.20
(-1 27) (-1 49)
0.02 -0.04
(0.13) (-0,30)
-0.19 -0.20
(-1 .66) (-1 .77)
0.00 -0.06
(0.00) (-0.88)
0.30 l *
(4.23)
-0.04
(-0.53)
0,02
(0.14)
0.14 l
(2.t3)
-0.05
(-0.80)
o.157 0.182
39.32 38.16
110.7 123.7
1.99 2.00
867 867
.-
.- ~.—
‘Significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.
l*Significant at the 1?4. level, two-tailed test..
aAW(-1 )
AW(-2)
AW(-3)
AW(-4)
AS
As(-l)
A!3(-2)
AS(-3)
AS(-4)
AV
AV(-I )
AV(-2)
AV(-3)
AV(4)
AK
AK(-1)
AK(-2)
AK(-3)
AK(4)
R-squared
SSR
logL
Durbin Watson
nr. of ohs.
..
Table 8b.
Regression Analysis of Annual Changes in WIP
Dependent vari
Toyota group
Uu
0.08 l 0.04
(2,11) (0.98)
-0.27 ** -0.25 l *
(-3.58) (-3.58)
-0.11 -0.10
(-1 ,43) (-1.29)
0.01 -0.04
(0.08) (-0.65)
0.11 0.14 l
(1 .83) (2.26)
1.03 ** 0.95 **
(4.04) (3.86)
0.44 0.49
(1,48) (1.54)
-0.56 -0.47
(-1.59) (-1 38)
0.05 -0.03
(0.18) (-0.11)
0.08 0.05
(0.39) (029)
-0.84 ** -084 **
(-3.50) (-3 31)
-0.68 * -0.88 l *
(-2.46) (-3 08)
014 0.11
(0.62) (0.47)
-0.03 -0.10
(-O.16) (-0.47)
0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.07)
0.36 l *
(2.64)
-0.27 l
(-2. 1o)
045
(1 34)
0.26
(1,56)
0.04
(0.30)
0.198 0.266
15.18 13.90
17.9 30.8
1.95 1.97
293 293
JIe:AW(t) = change
Nissan GrouD
&u?fLu
-0.03 -0.04
(-1 .09) (-1 .32)
-0.08 -0.05
(-1.13) (-0.70)
-0.05 0.01
(-0.64) (0. 13)
-0.10 -0.11
(-1 .24) (-1 .47)
0.04 0.06
(0.56) (0.89)
0.90 ** 0.70 **
(3.80) (3,30)
-0.29 -0.24
(-1.35) (-1 ,20)
0.12 0.20
(0.60) (0.95)
0.23 0.19
(1.27) (1.02)
-0.02 0.00
(-0.1 1) (0.02)
-0.18 -0.06
(-0.74) (-0.25)
0.28 0.17
(1.19) (0.82)
0.15 0.09
(0.71) (0.41)
-0.29 -0.22
(-1 .30) (-1 .04)
0.00 0.07
(0.00) (0.95)
0.53 l *
(3.40)
-0.12
(-0.99)
-0.31 l
(-2.36)
0.34 *
(2.49)
-0.22
(-1.50)
0.180 0.277
12.90 11.37
22.1 38.5
1.97 1.99
261 261
1WIP inventory
Others
-0.04 -0.05
(-1 .83) (-1.91)
-0.13 * -0.13 l
(-2.42) (-2.47)
-0.17 l * -0.17 **
(-3.36) (-3.37)
-0.06 -0.07
(-1.34) (-1 .36)
-0.06 -0.06
(-1.24) (-1 .27)
0,63 ** 0.67 “
(4,01) (4.39)
0.10 0.09
(0.70) (0.60)
0.09 0.11
(0.53) (0.59)
0.41 * 0.42 l
(2.30) (2,37)
0.07 0.07
(0.60) (0.56)
0,01 -0.04
(0.08) (-0.24)
-0.03 -0.04
(-0,21) (-0.29)
-0.12 -0.14
(-0.78) (-0.93)
-0.08 -0.10
(-0.59) (-0.71)
0.00 -0.06
(0.00) (-0.66)
0.17
(1 .68)
0.06
(0.55)
0.00
(-0.04)
0.01
(0.10)
-0.05
(-0.57)
0.156 0.164
24.50 24.28
77,1 79.5
2.04 2.04
553 553
%gnficantat the 5% level, two-tailed test.
Y3ignkant at the 1% level, two-tailed test.
